3/11 Disaster
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit Japan, rattling the nation. The subsequent tsunami caused major damage destroying several towns. The tsunami would also damage the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant as the tsunami’s waters reached up to fifty feet above sea level, sweeping over the plant’s seawall and flooding the lower parts of reactors one through four. While the Fukushima Power Plant would be designed for scenarios such as earthquakes and tsunamis, the 3/11 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami eclipsed even the worst-case scenarios. The floodwaters caused the failure of the emergency generators which led to the circulating pumps losing power. Fukushima would have three nuclear meltdowns, three hydrogen explosions, and the release of radioactive contaminants from reactor units one, two, and three while severely damaging reactor unit four. There would be subsequent leaks of nuclear material into tap water, the surrounding farmland, and the ocean. Fukushima would go on to be the second-worst nuclear disaster, only behind Chernobyl. However, the nuclear disaster itself would only be one part of a major socio-political shift in Japan.
One way to understand the events of the 3/11 disaster is the role of social media. Social media was a way to see a massive disaster from the perspective of citizens in real-time, but also, as David Slater notes, social media, more specifically Twitter, became a “hub for different kinds of information, but also a space to share emotions and anxieties.” People used hashtags to report road conditions, allowed NPO’s to know where supplies were needed, and people would use Geiger counters to take their own measurements to post on sharing sites. The latter action was done as the Japanese government was reluctant in showing radiation levels during Fukushima. Sakurai Katsunobu, Mayor of Minami-sōma City, located close to Fukushima’s nuclear power plant would upload a YouTube video stating that his city was not receiving the supplies needed to feed his citizens and criticized TEPCO, the electric company in charge of Fukushima, for giving inadequate information (Slater). Katsunobu’s actions were a symptom of an increase in distrust towards both the Japanese government and TEPCO.
Social media not only helped people on the ground gather information but also became a tool for political action as the Japanese government’s response would be heavily criticized. When TEPCO vice president Sakae Muto was doing press conferences addressing the ever-evolving situation at Fukushima, a memo from then TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu was given to memo to not say the term “meltdown” (The Mainichi). This was given by the office of then Prime Minister Naoto Kan, which he has denied. Another alarming event was the news of the meltdown as TEPCO did not declare meltdowns of three of the reactors until May 2011, two months after they had occurred (Asahi Shimbun). Japanese news outlets, such as the NHK, would also give radioactive levels during weather reports, trying to limit and downplay the severity (Imaoka 202). In addition, media outlets were also left with very little information about the disaster as they are in a relationship that is characterized as press clubs. As Toshio Takeshita and Masamichi Ida note, these press clubs serve to control access and the presentation of the news by “setting up clubs for each major government institution and by limiting the membership to these clubs”, essentially making news organizations a branch of the Japanese government (158). With little information to go on, many people used social media as a way to get information, compiling reports from citizens and international media. As Slater exclaims, much of the “initial leakage of stories on radiation dangers appeared on social media, or it was social media sites that brought together a range of revealing data, some of which was then picked up by the mainstream mass media.” The reports only caused further skepticism and distrust of government officials and media, causing anti-nuclear protests to erupt.
The triple disaster of 3/11 brought back nuclear fears and anxieties. The tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster left many displaced. However, the lack of information and at times disinformation of the Japanese government and media did an equal amount or more damage to the public. This led civilians to become citizen journalists as they posted information on social media that was not being reported by government and media channels. Distrust of the government also rose as did criticisms. The relationship between energy lobbyists and the Japanese government was also looked at as investigations revealed TEPCO’s failures to maintain the Fukushima nuclear plant. Soon, Toho would resurrect Godzilla from his ten-year slumber.
Sources
David H. Slater, Nishimura Keiko, and Love Kindstrand, "Social Media, Information, and Political Activism in Japan's 3.11 Crisis," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 24, No 1, June 11, 2012.
Imaoka, Laura Beltz, and Diane Negra. “Rain with a Chance of Radiation.” Extreme Weather and Global Media, edited by Julia Leyda, 1st Edition ed., Routledge, 2015, pp. 191–213.
“Japan Disaster Archive: Japan Disasters Archive.” Japan Disaster Archive | Japan Disasters Archive, Asahi Shimbun, 17 June 2017, jdarchive.org/en/item/2118493.
Takeshita Toshio and Ida, Masamichi. Political Communication in Asia, edited by Lars Willnat, and Annette Aw, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utd/detail.action?docID=406053.
“What's behind TEPCO Ban on Term 'Core Meltdown' after Fukushima Crisis?” The Mainichi, mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160617/p2a/00m/0na/013000c.